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EQUAL PROTECTION

In January of 1974, an admissions application was submitted on
behalf of Susan Vorchheimer to Central High School,' an all-male
educational facility within the Philadelphia school system. 2 Although
she fully met the academic requirements for admission to Central,3
Vorchheimer's application was rejected in February of that year because the Philadelphia school district limits Central's enrollment to
scholastically qualified males. 4 Thereafter, Vorchheimer, through her
parents, instituted a class action in federal district court naming the
school district and its superintendent as defendants. 5 The complaint
alleged that the school district's policy of denying admission to Central to otherwise qualified females violated the equal protection clause
1Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 532
F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr.
19, 1977).
At that time, Vorchheimer was an honor student at Masterman Junior High School in
Philadelphia. 400 F. Supp. at 327-28. Her decision to apply to Central was "[biased on
her observations during . . . visits" to it and other public high schools in Philadelphia,
as well as "on her past experience in" this school system. Id. at 327.
2 Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 327 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 532
F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr.
19, 1977). Four types of high schools were available to the plaintiff under the Philadelphia school district system: academic, comprehensive, technical and " 'magnet.' " Central High and Girls High, however, are the only academic high schools within the district. 400 F. Supp. at 327.
3
Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 532
F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr.
19, 1977). Admission to both Central High and Girls High is competitive, requiring high
performance on an aptitude test as well as above-average grades. 400 F. Supp. at 327.
4 Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 327-28 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 532
F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr.
19, 1977).
Girls High, the other academic high school in the district, limits its enrollment to
scholastically qualified females. 400 F. Supp. at 327. Vorchheimer decided not to attend
Girls High because, "in her words ...
'[she] didn't think [she] would be able to go
there . . . and not be harmed in any way by it.'" Id. at 327-28. After being denied
admission to Central, she enrolled at George Washington High School-a coeducational,
comprehensive, neighborhood school. Id. At present, Vorchheimer is a student at the
University of Pennsylvania. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1976, at 20, col. 2.
5 Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 333 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 532
F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr.
19, 1977).
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of the fourteenth amendment. 6
The district court determined that the complaint stated a claim
for the denial of equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 7 recog6 Brief of Appellants at 2, Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1977) [hereinafter
cited as Brief of Appellants].
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part that "no State shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
The complaint was amended to include an allegation that the school district's policy
was also violative of the equal rights amendment of the Pennsylvania constitution. See
Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 332-33 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d
800 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr. 19,
1977);Brief of Appellants, supra at 3. This amendment provides that "[e]quality of rights
under the law shall not be denied or abridged in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
because of the sex of the individual." PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28. For a synopsis of the
legislative history and the case law development of the Pennsylvania equal rights
amendment, see 14 DuQ. L. REV. 101, 106-10 (1975).
When a party raises a state claim in a federal case, the court may exercise what is
commonly referred to as pendent jurisdiction over that claim if both "It]he state and
federal claims . . . derive from a common nucleus of operative fact" and the federal
claim is found substantial. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
Because the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is discretionary rather than mandatory, the
trial judge may consider principles of comity and fairness as well as judicial economy
and convenience in his determination of whether or not to accept jurisdiction. Id. at
726. In Vorchheimer, the district court declined to accept pendent jurisdiction over the
claim under the Pennsylvania equal rights amendment "since standards governing the
applicability of this amendment in the educational field have not been clearly established by the state courts." 400 F. Supp. at 332-33.
For a more detailed explanation of pendent jurisdiction, see 13 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3567, at 443-46 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
7 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); see Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 332
(E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court,
45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1977). Section 1983 provides that
[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
Although "a school district [has not been recognized as] a 'person' " for the purposes of a section 1983 action, the officers of the school district, acting in their official
capacity, have been recognized as such, and a section 1983 action has been allowed
when such a party was a defendant in the action. Buhr v. Buffalo School Dist., 364 F.
Supp. 1225, 1226 (D.N.D. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 509 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1974).
Additionally, the district court recognized subject matter jurisdiction over Vorchheimer's claim by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970). Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400
F. Supp. at 332. Section 1343 grants original jurisdiction to federal district courts over
actions where the plaintiff alleges a deprivation of civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970); see 13 WRIGHT, supra note 6, § 3573,
at 484.
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nized the suit as a proper class action, and certified the affected
class.' Reaching the merits, the court found that since the school
district had failed to show that its policy of excluding otherwise
qualified females from Central bore a " 'fair and substantial relationship' " to its legitimate objectives, such a policy violated the equal
protection clause. 9 Consequently, the court issued an order enjoining
the school district from barring Vorchheimer or members of the representative class from Central "solely on the basis of sex."' 10
Following an appeal by the school district, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Vorchheirner v. School District of Philadelphia," reversed the decision of the district court. 1 2 A
majority of the appellate judges initially determined that no federal
legislation was applicable to the case at bar. 13 Addressing the equal
protection claim, the majority found that since a legitimate educational policy is served by single-sex academic high schools, 14 the exFor a more detailed explanation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343, see 13
WRIGHT su pra, § 3573.
8 Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 333 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 532
F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr.
19, 1977).
In the federal system, FED. R. Civ. P. 23 prescribes the guidelines for class actions.
Subdivision (a) lists the prerequisites for all class actions. After these requirements are
met, subdivision (b) identifies the three types of class actions. Id. FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(2), which is applicable here, identifies a class action as appropriate where "the
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory
relief with respect to the class as a whole." For a more extensive analysis of class actions under rule 23(b)(2) and, in particular, those dealing with civil rights, see 7a
WRIGHT, supra note 6, §§ 1775-76.
9 Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 333 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (citations omitted), rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W.
4378 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1977).
10 Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 333 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d
880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr. 19,
1977). The defendant's application to the district court for a stay of this order pending appeal was denied. On September 3, 1975, however, a stay was granted by the court of
appeals. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 6, at 4.
11 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378
(U.S. Apr. 19, 1977).
12 532 F.2d at 888.
13 Id. at 885. Questions of federal statutory law were neither at issue at the trial
level nor raised in the written briefs on appeal. See Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F.
Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1977); Brief of Appellants, supra note 6;
Reply Brief of Appellants, Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976),
aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1977); Brief of Appellees, Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1977).
14 532 F.2d at 887-88.
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clusion of females from Central by the school district solely on the
basis of sex was constitutionally permissible. 15 In reaching such a result, the majority relied upon the fact that the school district afforded
females an opportunity for admission to a school substantially equal
to Central I 6 and that enrollment at both schools was on a voluntary
basis.1 7 The dissent on the other hand, stated that the school district's
policy was in violation of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act,' 8
in addition to concluding, as had the district court, that excluding
otherwise qualified females from Central was a direct violation of the
equal protection clause. 19 On certiorari, 20 the court of appeals majority opinion was summarily affirmed by a four-to-four vote of the Supreme Court.21
The issue presented in the Vorchheimer case-whether the exclusion of an individual from a public school solely on the basis of sex
constitutes a denial of equal protection of the laws 2 2-is
one which
only recently has been litigated. 23 Historically, men and women were
afforded neither statutory nor constitutional protection against differentiations based on sex. 24 The earliest challenges to gender discrim15 Id.
16

Id. at 882.

17 1d. at 886.
18 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (Supp. V 1975); see
19 532 F.2d at 896.
20

532 F.2d at 889.

Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 97 S. Ct. 252 (1976), granting cert. to 532 F.2d 880

(3d Cir. 1976).
21 Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1977).
A summary affirmance by an equally divided Court is conclusive as to the parties to
the action, but is not itself authority for the resolution of future cases. See Laird v.
Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837-38 (1972) (memorandum of Rehnquist, J.); see United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942); Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1910); United
States v. Friedman, 528 F.2d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 1976). The reasoning behind this result
is that since a majority of the Court has not been able to agree on the resolution of the
principles of law at issue in the case, the Court's deadlock should be prevented from
becoming authority for a future case. 409 U.S. at 837-38.
The Supreme Court's summary affirmance of the Third Circuit opinion in Vorchheimer by an equally divided Court, therefore, has no precedential value itself. The
court of appeals decision, however, remains binding precedent for future cases in the
Third Circuit.
22 See 532 F.2d at 881. The majority framed the issue as follows: "Do the Constitution and laws of the United States require that every public school, in every public
school system in the Nation, be coeducational?" Id.
23 The first such challenge in a state court occurred in 1958, see Heaton v. Bristol,
317 S.W.2d 86 (Tex. Ct. App. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230 (1959), and in a federal
court in 1970, see Kirstein v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184
(E.D. Va. 1970), discussed at notes 47-53 infra and accompanying text.
24 See Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 872-74 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Brown]. For the history of unsuccessful challenges to sex discrimination, see id. at 875-82; Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in
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ination were based primarily on either the privileges and immunities
26
clause 25 or the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In 1948, the equal protection clause was first utilized as the sole
basis for challenging an essentially gender-based discrimination 27 in
Goesaert v. Cleary. 28 The plaintiffs in Goesaert challenged a state
statute which proscribed the licensing of a female as a bartender "unless she [was] 'the wife or daughter of the male owner' of a licensed
liquor establishment.- 2 9 Although the classification was challenged on
grounds that the distinction within the general class of women was
arbitrary, 3 0 the Court assumed for the purposes of analyzing this
issue that sex alone was a valid basis for classification. 3 1 Proceeding
from the assumption that the state could exclude all women from the
bartending profession, the Goesaert Court held that the statutory
classification within the general class of women was reasonable since
it might have been based upon the legitimate state interest in avoiding the "moral and social" dilemmas posed by the presence of
females, other than those belonging to the male owner's immediate
32
family, in such surroundings.
Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REV. 675, 678-741 (1971); Murray & Eastwood, Jane
Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232,
236-38 (1965); Note, Sex Discriminationand Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499, 1502-06 (1971); Comment, The Constitutionality of Sex Separation in School Desegregation Plans, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 296,
311-17 (1970).
25See, e.g., In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116, 117-18 (1894) (denial of right of female
attorney to practice law in Virginia found not violative of privileges and immunities
clause); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 170-71, 178 (1874) (women's suffrage not guaranteed by privileges and immunities clause); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872) (denial of right of female attorney to practice law in Illinois
found not violative of privileges and immunities clause).
26 See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1908). In this case, the Court found
that state regulation of maximum working hours for women was not violative of due
process. Id. The Court distinguished Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which
forbade a state from setting similar regulations for bakers, id. at 53, 64, on grounds that
the physical characteristics of women warranted special protection. 208 U.S. at 418-23.
For examples of other cases upholding gender classifications against due process
attacks, see West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 388, 394-95 (1937); Radice v.
New York, 264 U.S. 292, 295 (1924); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 380-81 (1915); Riley
v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671, 679-81 (1914).
27 See Brown, supra note 24, at 877.
28 335 U.S. 464 (1948).

29 Id. at 465 (quoting from Act of Apr. 30, 1945, Pub. Act No. 133, § 19a, 1945 Mich.
Pub. Acts 146).
30 335 U.S. at 465-66.

31 Id. The Goesaert Court's assumption that a state "could, beyond question, forbid

all women from working behind a bar," id. at 465, follows directly from the Supreme
Court's prior declaration that a woman "is properly placed in a class by herself." Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (emphasis added).
32 335 U.S. at 466-67. The Court added that because the statutory classification was
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The equal protection analysis employed in Goesaert is referred to
today as the rational relationship or minimum scrutiny test.3 3 Under
this test, the challenger bears the burden of demonstrating that the
classification is wholly arbitrary or lacks a rational relationship to a
legitimate state objective. 34 Such an analysis, however, is virtually
pro forma in application since classifications challenged under this
test consistently have been upheld. 35 In contrast, when a constitutionally suspect classification 36 is under attack, a strict scrutiny test
"not without a basis in reason," there was no need to consider the suggestion that the
true purpose behind the law may have been to restrict the occupation of bartending to
males. Id. at 467.
33 See Johnston & Knapp, supra note 24, at 684.
34 E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961) (a classification is unconstitutional "only if ... wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective");
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911) (the Court will assume
the existence of any statement of facts which reasonably can be conceived to justify a
legislative classification, and the challenger bears the burden of demonstrating that the
classification is "essentially arbitrary").
For a more detailed explanation of the minimum scrutiny test, see Developments in
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1077-87 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
Developments].
35 See Developments, supra note 34, at 1077-78. For classifications which have been
upheld under minimum scrutiny, see, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York,
336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949) (company vehicles allowed to advertise own products but
forbidden to carry advertisements for others); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot
Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 562, 564 (1947) (upholding pilotage law which in operation
barred all but relatives and friends of existing pilots from entering profession).
For gender-based classifications which have been upheld under this test, see, e.g.,
Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 58, 62 (1961) (state statute calling for compulsory jury duty
for males but optional jury duty for females held constitutional); Miskunas v. Union
Carbide Corp., 399 F.2d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 1968) (right of recovery from loss of consortium restricted to males), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1066 (1969); Gruenwald v. Gardner, 390
F.2d 591, 592-93 (2d Cir.) (differing social security benefits for men and women constitutionally permissible), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968); United States v. St. Clair,
291 F. Supp. 122, 124-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (constitutionally permissible to exclude
women from compulsory military service because "if a nation is to survive, men must
provide the first line of defense while women keep the home fires burning").
36 Suspect classifications include race, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967),
and alienage, see Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). In Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976), and Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-87 (1976),
however, the suspect characterization of classifications based on alienage was not employed by the Court in its analysis of equal protection challenges brought against the
federal government under the fifth amendment due process clause. These cases effectively limit the characterization of alienage classifications as suspect to state action challenged directly under the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. See 426 U.S.
at 85.
Although the Court has declared certain classes to be suspect, it has never provided
a definite test for determining whether a classification should be so characterized. Traditionally, one could refer to Justice Stone's now famous footnote in United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938), where he suggests that the Court
might give special constitutional protection to those "discrete and insular minorities"
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is employed: the state must demonstrate that a compelling interest is
furthered by the classification 37 and that this compelling objective
cannot be met by a less restrictive course of action. 38 While racial
classifications have clearly been declared suspect under such an
39
analytical framework and therefore tested under strict scrutiny,
gender-based classifications have not been so classified 40 and consequently, have been traditionally tested under minimum scrutiny
standards. 41
This differing treatment of racial and gender-based classifications
has been highlighted in the area of public education. Racially segregated schools were invalidated as being "inherently unequal" in
Brown v. Board of Education,4 2 but apparently since the courts have
unable themselves to form effective political alliances. Id. Thus, legislation which contains such classifications would be subjected to closer judicial scrutiny than would
otherwise be utilized.
More recently, the Court has noted that some indicators of a suspect class include
being "subjected to .. .a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a
position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
In addition to suspect classifications, rights which the Court has found to be "fundamental" are subjected to strict scrutiny. Such rights, outside of the criminal context,
include voting, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964), the right to travel
interstate, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969), and the right to procreate, see Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). The Court
has recently restricted the definition of a fundamental right to one which is "explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." San Antonio Independent School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 33-35 (declaring that education is not a fundamental right).
For a more detailed discussion of the strict scrutiny test, see Developments, supra
note 34, at 1087-1120.
37
E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9, 11 (1967) (state must demonstrate a compelling state interest to justify legislative classification based upon race); see Developments, supra note 34, at 1087-91.
3
RE.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969) (one-year state residency requirement for welfare benefits declared unconstitutional because there were "less drastic means" of preventing welfare fraud under strict scrutiny test); Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, a Justification, and
Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971, 1038 (1974). For a summary of the influence of
this principle on constitutional adjudication in general, see id. at 1036-41.
39
E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
7
40532 F.2d at 886 & n. . But see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678, 682
(1973) (plurality opinion declaring sex to be a suspect class). For a discussion of the
present status of gender-based classifications, see notes 70-73 infra and accompanying
text.
41 See notes 23-35 supra and accompanying text.
42 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (declaring that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal").
Many years prior to the Brown decision, racial classifications had been invalidated
in a number of contexts. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (enforce-
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viewed gender-based classifications differently than those based upon
race, 43 the Brown rationale has never been successfully employed in
attacks upon sex segregation in the public schools." Thus, a "separate
but equal" approach 4 5 has been deemed appropriate in a number of
post-Brown challenges to admissions policies at single-sex public
schools.46
For example, in Kirstein v. Rector and Visitors of the University
of Virginia,4 7 female plaintiffs challenged an all-male admissions policy at the state university at Charlottesville. 4 8 Based on their finding
that the curriculum at Charlottesville and the " 'prestige' " associated
with the school were unique in the state educational system, 49 the
federal district court determined that the gender-based admissions
policy at Charlottesville was unconstitutional.5 0 Since the court concluded that the facilities provided for males and females were unment of racially restrictive covenants by state courts held to be impermissible state action under the fourteenth amendment); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 73, 82 (1917)
(ordinances prohibiting blacks from living in certain neighborhoods held unconstitutional); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879) (statutory exclusion of blacks
from juries held unconstitutional). Racial classifications, however, had been upheld in
the use and enjoyment of public facilities, including public schools. See Gong Lum v.
Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 87 (1927) (racial segregation as practiced by public school system
held to be consistent with equal protection); McCabe v. Atchison, T. & Santa Fe Ry.,
235 U.S. 151, 161-62 (1914) (state may properly require racial segregation of passengers
in intrastate transportation but must offer equal facilities to both races). Such segregationalist policies had been deemed permissible under the authority of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540, 549 (1896), as long as the public facility involved met the
"separate but equal" standard. The doctrine began to erode, however, when in
Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), the Court concluded that the separate law schools made
available by the state to blacks and whites were not equal, since, in comparison to the
all-black school, the all-white "[l]aw [s]chool possesse[d] to a far greater degree those
qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness."
Id. at 633-35.
For a general discussion of the historical background of the "separate but equal"
doctrine, see Frank & Munro, The Original Understandingof "Equal Protection of the
Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131 (1950).
43 See notes 27-35 supra and accompanying text.
44See notes 46-60 infra and accompanying text.
45See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 540, 549 (1896).
46 See, e.g., Allred v. Heaton, 336 S.W.2d 251, 260, 262 (Tex. Civ. App.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 517 (1960); Heaton v. Bristol, 317 S.W.2d 86, 91, 100 (Tex. Civ. App.
1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 230 (1959). For cases brought in federal court on this issue,
see cases discussed in text accompanying notes 47-60 infra.
47309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D. Va. 1970).
48 Id. at 185-86.
49 Id. at 187 & n.1.
50Id. at 187. Although the court expressed agreement with plaintiffs' constitutional
claim, the suit was nevertheless dismissed for mootness, as the university was in the
process of implementing a constitutionally acceptable plan for coeducation. Id. at
188-89.
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equal in fact, 5 1 it was unnecessary for the court to determine whether
a "separate but equal" standard was constitutionally permissible in
this area. 5 2 Only if an equivalent all-female school had existed, would
it have been necessary for the court to address that issue. 53
Later that year another federal district court, in Williams v.
McNair,54 was presented with the issue not directly addressed by the
Kirstein court. 55 Employing a "separate but equal" analysis, the Williams court denied relief to the male plaintiffs who sought admission
to the all-female, state-run Winthrop College, 56 thereby upholding
the validity of a single-sex public college. 5 7 The decision was based
on grounds that the state provided, in addition to the college in question, a number of coeducational colleges as well as an all-male institution, and that there was no "special feature connected with Winthrop
that w[ould] make it more advantageous educationally . . . than any

number of other State-supported institutions.- 58 Thus, the court
found the state system of higher education not violative of equal protection because the facilities offered to men in the state, albeit separate in some instances from those offered to women, were substantially equivalent. 59 Accordingly, the assumption employed in the Williams case and in the application of the "separate but equal" doctrine
in general is that equal educational opportunity should be available
to both sexes, but that such opportunity may be made available in
single-sex schools as long as the facilities provided for each sex are
60
substantially equal.
Subsequent to these lower court decisions concerning the consti51 Id.
52

at 187 & n.1.

Id.

5 See id.
5 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970) (three-judge district court), aff'd mem., 401 U.S.
951 (1971).
55 316 F. Supp. at 138-39.
56 Id. at 135, 138.
57 See id. at 138.
58Id. at 137-38. Applying the rational relationship test to the gender-based admission policy, the court found that "a respectable body of educators . . . believe that 'a
single-sex institution can advance the quality and effectiveness of its instruction by concentrating upon areas of primary interest to only one sex.' " Id. at 137 (quoting from trial
stipulations). Additionally, the court observed that many "institutions . . . limit their
enrollment to one sex .. .because they feel it offers better educational advantages." 316
F. Supp. at 137. Thus, the classification, based on rational, "respectable pedagogical
opinion," was found to be constitutional. Id. at 138.
5
9See 316 F. Supp. at 137-39.
60 See Comment, Sex Discrimination in College Admissions: The Quest for Equal
Educational Opportunities,56 IOWA L. REV. 209, 217 (1970).
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tutionality of single-sex public schools, the Supreme Court moved toward recognizing the equal rights of both sexes. In 1971, in Reed v.
Reed,6 ' the Court declared that a state statute which preferred men
6 2
to women as administrators of intestate estates was unconstitutional.
Chief Justice Burger, although not declaring sex a suspect class, noted
that classifications, in addition to being reasonable, " 'must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation.' "63 While recognizing that the statutory objective of efficient judicial administration was a legitimate one, he
nevertheless concluded that to prefer males over females in attempting to effectuate this goal "is to make the very kind of arbitrary legisla64
tive choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause."
The Reed decision, along with other decisions of the Burger
Court,65 have created interest regarding the possible emergence of a
new level of constitutional scrutiny. 66 Under this emerging standard,
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Id. at 74. The Idaho statute at issue set priority classifications for the court appointment of individuals to administer intestate estates. See IDAHO CODE § 15-312
(1948). Under this statutory classification system, the surviving spouse was given first
priority while creditors were given last priority. Id.; see 404 U.S. at 72-73. The statute
further provided that within each classification males were to be preferred to females.
IDAHO CODE § 15-314 (1948); see 404 U.S. at 73.
63 404 U.S. at 76 (quoting from Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415
(1920)).
64 404 U.S. at 76.
65 See, e.g., United States Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533-38 (1973)
(statutory classifications limiting food-stamp distribution to households of related persons found not rationally related to the stated purpose of the legislation); Jackson v.
Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 723-30 (1972) (procedures for pretrial commitment of incompetent criminal defendants are violative of equal protection because they afford less protection than those given the civilly committed); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
447-55 (1972) (statute failed equal protection test because asserted governmental interest was not the true purpose of a statutory classification limiting distribution of contraceptives to married persons).
66 See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 20 (1972) (Court is using a "means-focused" model whereby "legislative means
must substantially further legislative ends"); Nowak, Realigning the Standards of
Review Under the Equal Protection Guarantee-Prohibited,Neutral, and Permissive
Classifications, 62 GEO. L.J. 1071, 1093-94 (1974) (when neutral classification is involved, "[t]he Court will scrutinize the factual support for the legislation to determine
whether its ends are capable of withstanding analysis and whether its means are rationally related to [those] end[s]"); Comment, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 807, 817-22 (1973) (Court employs a
"substantial relationship in fact" test). But cf. Note, The Emerging Bifurcated Standard
for Classifications Based on Sex, 1975 DUKE L.J. 163, 177-84 (when gender-based
classifications are examined, Court employs the strict scrutiny test "sub rosa" whenever classification is viewed as detrimental to women, but employs minimum scrutiny
when it views the classification as beneficial to women (emphasis in original)).
61

62

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 336

typically termed the substantial relationship or strict rationality test, 6 7
the challenged governmental action must be shown to substantially
further legislative ends which "have [a] substantial basis in actuality
[rather than] conjecture." 68 In application, this test has a two-fold
effect. First, the party defending the state action will be required to
demonstrate its justifying rationale; a presumption that the challenged
state action is justified will not be entertained. Second, in determining the reasonableness of the classification, the court will confine it69
self solely to the evidence brought before it.
Although, since the Reed decision, a plurality opinion of the
Supreme Court has declared sex a suspect classification requiring examination under strict scrutiny standards, 70 this position has never
been adopted by a majority of the Court. 7 1 As a result, it is presently
unclear which standard of scrutiny is appropriate in a given case involving a gender-based classification. It seems, however, that when
the Court recognizes a classification as gender-based and perceives it
as adversely affecting women, it strikes down the practice in question
67 Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 336 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (" 'strict
rationality' "), rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45
U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1977); See Gunther, supra note 66, at 20 ("substantial
relationship").
The seminal article on the substantial rtlationship test was authored by Professor
Gerald Gunther. Professor Gunther suggests that a model for equal protection analysis
could be based on a requirement that "the Court take seriously a constitutional requirement that has never been formally abandoned: that legislative means must substantially further legislative ends." Id.
68 Gunther, supra note 66, at 21.
69 See id. It should be noted that Gunther himself acknowledges some limitations in
his model. First, it is difficult to predict when this newest level of scrutiny will be
utilized. Id. at 36. Second, even when it may be demonstrated that the Court had used
this newest test, the Court still utilized the idiom or language of minimum scrutiny, or
the rational relationship test, when doing so. Id. Finally, the intensity of the Court's
scrutiny under this test varies from case to case. Id. at 33.
70
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682-88 (1973). Justice Brennan, author of
the plurality opinion, was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and Douglas. Id. at 678.
In declaring sex a suspect class, Justice Brennan noted that
what differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical
disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform .... As a result,
statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the
actual capabilities of its individual members.
Id. at 686-87 (footnote omitted). Justices Powell and Blackmun, along with Chief Justice
Burger, concurred in the result, id. at 691, but believed that because the equal rights
amendment had been submitted to the states for ratification, the plurality was "acting
prematurely and unnecessarily" in declaring sex a suspect class, id. at 692.
71532 F.2d at 886 & n.7.
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appears to be a substantial relationship test. 72 On the
when the Court perceives the challenged classification as
of past gender discrimination, it will generally uphold
in question. 73

72 For example, in Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), the plaintiff challenged
UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-2-1 (1953) which mandated parental financial support of sons
until they reached the age of 21, while requiring parents to support daughters only until
they reached the age of 18. 421 U.S. at 9-10. Finding the challenged law unconstitutional, the Court considered the Reed decision "controlling" because the Utah statute,
like the statute in Reed, assigned persons to " 'classes on the basis of criteria wholly
unrelated to the objective of that statute.' " Id. at 13 (quoting from Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. at 75-76). Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, concluded that the statutory
distinction in parental support obligation was not warranted by the difference in the
child's sex because the distinction was not, in fact, related to the objectives of the legislation. 421 U.S. at 8, 13-17. The Court added that no equal protection test could be
satisfied by reliance on " 'old notions' " of stereotypes as a justification for differing
treatments of males and females. Id. at 14, 17 (dictum).
For examples of other cases where the Court has found that a gender-based classification did not further the actual objectives of the questioned legislation, see Califano v.
Goldfarb, 97 S. Ct. 1021 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975),
discussed at note 73 infra.
In Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), however, the Court employed a
minimum scrutiny test in concluding that an insurance program for state employees
which excluded normal pregnancies from its coverage was not a sex-based classification.
Id. at 496-97 & n. 2 0. Justice Stewart reasoned that "[t]he program divides potential
recipients into two groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons." Id. at 497 n. 2 0.
Thus, the Court employed minimum scrutiny solely because it did not initially find a
sex-based classification. See id. at 496-97 & n.20.
Recently, in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 97 S. Ct. 401 (1976), the Court held that
the denial of pregnancy benefits in an employer's disability plan did not violate section
703(a)(1) of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2 00 0 e- 2 (Supp. V 1975).
97 S. Ct. at 413. Although the General Electric case was a title VII action, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, relied most heavily on the above analysis in Geduldig in
order to determine that the classification in General Electric was like that in Geduldig-not gender-based. See id. at 406-10.
73 Illustrative of this approach is the case of Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). In
Kahn, a widower challenged the constitutionality of a state statute which granted a $500
tax exemption to widows on grounds that widowers should be accorded similar treatment, Id. at 352. Noting that there was a continuing disparity between the wages of
men and women, id. at 353, the majority observed that "[w]hile the widower can usually continue in the occupation which preceded his spouse's death," a widow might be
"forced into [an unfamilar] job market . . . in which . . . she will have fewer skills to

offer." Id. at 354. Therefore, since widows and widowers were generally not on an
equal plane with respect to economic status, their differing treatment under Florida law
was deemed constitutional. Id. at 355. It may be noted, however, that the Court relied
on the additional fact that the legislation in question was a tax law and generally,
" '[where taxation is concerned ....
the States have large leeway in making classifications . . . which in their judgment produce reasonable systems of taxation.' " Id. (quoting from Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 359 (1973)) (brackets
supplied by the Court).
Another case in which the Court identified a gender-based classification as
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Contemporaneous with case law development in the area of gender classifications, Congress has attempted to equalize the availability
of certain educational facilities by the enactment of title IX of the
ameliorative of past discrimination against women and upheld the classification is
Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975). In Schlesinger, a male officer challenged a federal statute which required he be discharged from the Navy because he had
been "passed over" twice for promotion, on grounds that female officers were guaranteed several more years of service than were males. Id. at 499-500. Compare 10 U.S.C.
§ 6 3 8 2 (a) (1970) (mandatory discharge provision for males) with id. § 6401 (mandatory
discharge provision for females). The Court found that the legislative decision to discriminate in favor of women was rational, and thus constitutional, because women were
discriminated against in sea and air duty assignments. 419 U.S. at 508-09; see 10 U.S.C.
§ 6015 (1970). The Court stressed "the demonstrable fact that male and female line
officers in the Navy are not similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional" advancement. 419 U.S. at 508 (emphasis by the Court). Thus, it seems that the
Court justified gender differentiation in mandatory discharge provisions from the Navy
because these provisions had the effect of ameliorating some of the effects of the discriminatory practice of excluding women from air and sea duty. See id.at 508-09.
The Court warned, however, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) that
"the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield
which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory
scheme." Id. at 648. In Weinberger, a widower with a dependent child challenged the
constitutionality of a provision of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1970),
which provided benefits to a widow with a dependent child, but not to a similarly
situated widower. 420 U.S. at 637-38. The government claimed that the purpose of the
legislation in question was to provide a guaranteed income to women who might be
unable to provide for themselves and their dependents because of economic discrimination. Id. at 646. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, disagreed. He determined, by
an examination of the statutory scheme and its history, that the true purpose of the
provision in question was to allow widowed mothers the option of staying home with
their minor children, rather than to mitigate the effect of economic discrimination
against women. Id. at 648. In light of this purpose, Justice Brennan termed the challenged gender-based classification as "irrational" because there was no reason to disallow such an option to widowers. Id. at 651. Emphasizing the unfairness of the statutory
classification to the deceased wife of the plaintiff, Justice Brennan found the challenged
gender-based distinction unconstitutional since it discriminated against female workers
who paid social security tax by affording such wage earners less protection for their
survivors than had been afforded to similarly situated males. Id. at 645.
Recently, Justice Brennan authored a plurality opinion emphasizing the same
points. In Califano v. Goldfarb, 97 S. Ct. 1021 (1977), a widower challenged provisions
of the Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-403 (1970).
See 96 S. Ct. at 1024-25. The particular provisions provided for benefits to a widow on
the basis of her deceased husband's earnings but provided similar benefits to "a
widower . . .only if he 'was receiving at least one-half of his support' " from his wife
prior to her death. 42 U.S.C. § 402(f)(1) (1970); see 97 S.Ct. 1024. As in Weinberger, the
government asserted that the purpose of the statute was ameliorative. Id. at 1025-26.
Justice Brennan, however, disagreed, concluding
that the differential treatment of nondependent widows and widowers results
not .. .from a deliberate congressional intention to remedy the arguably greater needs of the former, but rather from an intention to aid the dependent
spouses of deceased wage earners, coupled with a presumption that wives are
usually dependent.
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Educational Amendments of 1972 (title IX). 74 Although title IX generally prohibits sex discrimination in federally assisted educational
facilities, 75 it exempts, inter alia, the admissions policies of secondary
schools. 76 Although the original proposed version of the Act applied
Id. at 1032. Since such an assumption was based on " 'archaic and overbroad' generalizations," id. at 1026 (quoting from Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. at 508), it did not
justify the discrimination against the female wage earner whose survivors had less protection than a similarly situated male. See 97 S. Ct. at 1026-27, 1032.
On the other hand, another recent opinion, Califano v. Webster, 97 S. Ct. 1197
(1977), recognized the constitutional validity of a statute which did, in fact, ameliorate
the past economic discrimination against women. Id. at 1094-95, The male plaintiff in
this case challenged the effect of certain provisions of the Social Security Act. Id. at
1093-94. These provisions, before they were amended in 1972, allowed for greater oldage benefits for female workers upon retirement than males since a woman could exclude three more low-earning years from the computation than could a male worker. 42
U.S.C. § 415(b) (1970); see 97 S. Ct. at 1093-94. In a per curiam opinion, the Court
concluded that the disparity in treatment was permissible because the purpose of the
legislation was "to compensate women for past economic discrimination." Id. at 1195.
The Court added that the 1972 amendments, equalizing the treatment of male and
female retirees in this respect, was not an admission that the provisions in question
here were discriminatory. Id. at 1196. Rather, the Court remarked that Congress may
have believed that recent federal legislation in the areas of wage and job discrimination
may " 'have lessened the economic justification for the [previous] more favorable benefit
... formula.' " Id.
For further examination of cases involving gender-based classifications, other than
those decided in the 1976-77 term, see Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme
Court-1975, 23 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 235, 239-45 (1975); Note, supra note 66, at 173-84.
74 Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, §§ 902-905, 907, 86 Stat. 375 (current version at 20
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (Supp. V 1975)). For a general commentary on the legislative history of title IX and an analysis of its provisions, see Buek & Orleans, Sex Discrimination--A Bar to a Democratic Education: Overview of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 6 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1973).
The HEW 'regulations concerning title IX, codified at 45 C.F.R. § 86.1-71 (1976),
became effective in July 1975, id. § 86.1. For an analysis of these regulations, see
Comment, Implementing Title IX: The HEW Regulations, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 806
(1976).
Legislation furthering equality of the sexes in areas other than education includes
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-4 (1970 & Supp. V
1975) (forbidding sex discrimination in private employment), and The Equal Pay Act of
1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970) (prohibiting wage discrimination on the basis of sex).
7520 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (Supp. V 1975). This section provides that "[n]o person in the
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
76
See id. § 1681(a)(1). Title IX applies only to the admissions policies of the following types of schools: "institutions of vocational education, professional education, and
graduate higher education, and, . . .public institutions of undergraduate higher education." Id. For the remaining original exemptions to title IX, see id. § 1681(a)(2)-(5).
Amendments to title IX, enacted in December 1974, created additional exceptions
to the Act's general prohibition against sex discrimination in the educational field. Act
of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-568, § 3(a), 88 Stat. 1862 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(a)(6)(A)-(B) (Supp. V 1975)).
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to a broad range of educational institutions, 7 7 the 1972 amendments
restricting title IX's coverage were proposed "because many felt that
the admissions policies of too many schools were covered without sufficient study and debate."-78 A call for further hearings was made from
the floor of the Senate so that questions with respect to the possibly
overbroad application of title IX could be answered; it was argued
that only after this data had been gathered could "Congress . . .
make a fully informed decision" in the matter. 7 9 To date, however,
Congress has taken no action regarding the advisability of including
secondary school admissions policies within the mandates of title IX;
rather, the Act was amended in 1974 to provide for more exemptions
from its coverage. 8 0
In addition to title IX, the Equal Educational Opportunities Act
of 1974 (EEOA) 8 1 declares that "equal educational opportunity"
should be afforded to "all [students] enrolled in public schools . . .
without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin."-8 2 The EEOA
was proposed originally in 197283 as a means of restricting the use of
busing as a judicial remedy to achieve racial integration, 8 4 but it was
not enacted. 8 5 At that time the EEOA did not include sex among
the objectionable classifications of race, color and national origin. 86
77 See S. 1123, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., tit. IX, § 1005 (1971) (proposed by Senator
Prouty), reprinted in Education Amendments of 1971: Hearings on S. 659 Before the
Subcomm. of Educ. of the Comm. on Lab. and Pub. Welf., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 227-99
(1971). Section 1001(a) of S. 1123 provided that "[n]o person in the United States shall,
on the ground of sex, be discriminated against by a recipient of Federal financial assistance for any education program or activity." Id. at 296-97. Education was defined in
section 1005 of S. 1123 as "includ[ing] preschool, elementary, secondary, and post-secondary education." Id. at 299.
78 118 CONG. REC. 5804 (1972) (remarks of Senator Bayh).
79 Id. at 5807.
80 See Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-568, § 3(a), 88 Stat. 1862 (codified at 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a)(6)(A)-(B) (Supp. V 1975)) (exempting fraternities, sororities, and voluntary youth service organizations from title IX's coverage).
si 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (Supp. V 1975).
82 Id. § 1701(a)(1).
83 H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in Equal Educational Opportunities Act: Hearing on H.R. 13915, H.R. 13983, and H.R. 15299 Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. and Lab., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-19 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Gen. Subcomm. Hearing], and in Equal EducationalOpportunities
Act: Hearings on H.R. 13915 Before the Comm. on Educ. and Lab., 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
1-6 (1972) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 13915 Hearings].
84 President's Message to Congress on School Busing, 118 CONG. REc. 8928-34
(1972).
85 See 532 F.2d at 884, 118 CONG. REc. 35329-30 (1972).
8
6See H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2(a)(1), 3(a)(1), 101(a)(2), 201-203, 401(c),
404, 406 (1972), reprinted in Gen. Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 83, at 2-19, and in
H.R. 13915 Hearings,supra note 83, at 1-6.

197'71

NOTES

Although the present EEOA, enacted in 1974,87 prohibits the assignment of any student to a school other than the one closest to the
student's home "if the assignment results in a greater degree of segregation" based on "race, color, sex, or national origin," '8 8 there is no
indication that the Act's primary purpose is different from that of the
original bill. 8 9
In light of the possible relevancy of federal legislation to genderbased admissions policies, Judge Weis, writing for the Third Circuit
majority in Vorchheimer, examined both title IX and the EEOA to
determine whether the maintenance of single-sex academic high
schools by the Philadelphia school district was prohibited by either
statute. 90 Judge Weis noted that not only was title IX inapplicable to
secondary school admissions policies, 9 1 but that the record of Senate
debate on the statute revealed a patent congressional intent to create
such an exemption. 92 Significantly, in the process of concluding that
title IX permitted single-sex secondary schools, the majority added
87 Act of Aug. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, 88 Stat. 514 (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1753 (Supp. V 1975).
88 20 U.S.C. § 1703(c) (Supp. V 1975). This section prohibits
the assignment by an educational agency of a student to a school, other than the
one closest to his or her place of residence within the school district in which
he or she resides, if the assignment results in a greater degree of segregation of
students on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin among the schools of
such agency than would result if such student were assigned to the school closest to his or her place of residence within the school district of such agency providing the appropriate grade level and type of education for such student ....
Id. (emphasis added). Other sections which specify sex as an objectionable classification along with race, color, and national origin include id. §§ 1701(a)(1), 1702(a)(1), 1704,
1705, 1715, 152 0(c), 1752 & 1756.
Certain subsections of section 1703, however, do not list sex as a forbidden classification. See id. § 1703(a), (d)-(e). Other sections of the EEOA also fail to include sex as
an objectionable classification. See id. §§ 17 13(c), 1717. There is no apparent explanation, within the statute or its legislative history, for the inclusion of sex as a prohibited
classification in some sections of the Act and its omission as a prohibited classification
in others.
89 Compare H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 401-409 (1972), reprinted in Gen.
Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 83, at 12-18 and in H.R. 13915 Hearings,supra note 83,
at 4-6, with 20 U.S.C. §§ 1751-1759 (Supp. V 1975). See also 120 CONG. REC. H2161
(daily ed. Mar. 26, 1974), where Representative Ford indicated that the present EEOA
was proposed on the floor of the House for precisely this purpose.

90532 F.2d at 881, 883-85.

91Id.; see 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975), quoted at note 75 supra.
92 532 F.2d at 883-85. In the Senate debate, Senator Bayh stated that he
believe[d] specific hearings [we]re needed to answer these questions which
had not been raised at the time of the 1970 hearings .... After these questions
have been properly addressed, then Congress can make a fully informed decision on the question of which-if any-schools should be exempted.
118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972).
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that any subsequent legislation forbidding this practice should be
"clear and unequivocal," and the product of data detailing the detrimental effect of such a policy. 93
In view of the fact that the EEOA's legislative history demonstrated that this statute was not enacted as a result of any such data
regarding the effects of gender-based admissions policies at the secondary school level, 94 Judge Weis proceeded to examine the language
of the Act on its face. 95 This examination led him to conclude that the
EEOA was "at best ambiguous" 96 because, although the statutory policy statement proscribes the "maintenance of dual school systems"
based upon sex as well as race, color or national origin,9 7 the provisions of the statute do not actually "prohibit the states from" setting
up such a gender-classified system. 9 8 Moreover, the majority found it
"questionable" that the facts of Vorchheimer demonstrated either a
dual school system or an assignment within the coverage of the
statute. 99 Therefore, the majority found the EEOA inapplicable to
the single-sex academic high schools maintained by the Philadelphia
school district. 100

Since no federal legislation addressed the problem authoritatively,
the majority then considered the constitutional issue directly. 1' 1 Initially, Judge Weis observed that the district court, on the basis of its
analysis of Supreme Court decisions in the area of gender discrimination since 1971, had concluded that, given the facts of Vorchheimer, a
stricter standard of scrutiny applied which it termed the " 'fair and
substantial relationship test.' "102 Tested under this standard, it was
93 532 F.2d at 885.
9 Id. at 884-85. See generally H.R. REP. No. 1335, supra note 84; H.R. 13915 Hearings, supra note 83.
95 532 F.2d at 885.
91Id. at 884.
97 20 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975); see 532 F.2d at 884.
98 Id. Thus, the ambiguity arises because the provisions of the Act do not prohibit
practices which its policy statement implies should be prohibited. For the policy statement of the Act, see text accompanying note 75 supra. For the prohibited practices
which do not include sex as a prohibited classification, see note 88 supra.
9 532 F.2d at 885. For a discussion of the terms "dual school system" and "assignment," see notes 131 & 133 infra.
100 532 F.2d at 885.
101 Id.

at 885-86.

(quoting from Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76). In fact, the lower court had
determined that "the outcome of this case depends on which standard of review is
applied." Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1976), rev'd, 532
F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr.
19, 1977). Although recognizing the traditional appropriateness of the minimum scrutiny, or rational relationship, test in the area of gender classification, Judge Newcomer
102 Id.
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noted, the district court had found that the exclusion of Vorchheimer
from Central High School solely on the basis of her sex violated the
equal protection clause. 10 3 The Third Circuit majority proceeded,
however, to distinguish Vorchheimer from this line of Supreme Court
cases by noting that such precedent had involved the denial of a benefit to females, whereas the present case involved no such denial to
04
the plaintiff even though she was denied admission to Central.1
Rather, the majority concluded that the school district made available
equal educational opportunity to both sexes. 10 5 Consequently, the
court considered the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Wilhiams v. McNair,10 6 which upheld the exclusion of males from an allnoted that the Supreme Court's more recent rulings in this area were "unclear, but the
net effect . . . has been to . . . place [gender-based classifications] in a new and unchartered territory." 400 F. Supp. at 335. After reviewing all of these cases and several
theories to rationalize them, the lower court ultimately concluded "that the Court is not
applying a uniform standard . .. . but will apply a different standard depending on
whether the classification is viewed as beneficial or adverse to women." Id. at 341-42.
Thus, Judge Newcomer concluded that when a gender-based classification is viewed as
detrimental to women, the Court applies the new substantial relationship test; otherwise, the Court applies minimum scrutiny. Id.
Judge Newcomer then "identified [the] classification [in this case] as adversely affecting women," therefore finding the substantial relationship test the appropriate level
of scrutiny. Id. at 343. In employing this test, he "examin[ed] the evidence before [him]
to see if it establish[ed] [that the gender-based classification bore] a 'fair and substantial
relationship' to the School Board's legitimate interests" rather than "search[ing] for conceivable justifications for it." Id. (quoting from Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76). Employing this test, he noted that the legitimate objectives of the school district were to promote academic achievement and to provide for a "choice" of "educational alternatives."
He concluded that the school district's policy did not bear a substantial relationship to
these objectives, however, because the evidence presented failed to demonstrate that
coeducation had an adverse impact on academic achievement and that the purported
"alternative" of single-sex high schools on the academic level created essentially no
choice at all on that level. 400 F. Supp. at 332-33, 343. For a discussion of the lower
court's treatment of the evidence presented, see note 118 infra.
103532 F.2d at 886.
1o4Id. Referring specifically to the cases of Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973); and Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), and Reed, Judge Weis noted that "[i]n
each instance where a statute was struck down, the rights of the respective sexes conflicted, and those of the female were found to be inadequate." 532 F.2d at 886. Additionally, the majority found it "significan[t]" that "none [of these cases] occurred in an educational setting." Id. The majority additionally made a distinction between "[t]he nature
of the discrimination" involved in the present case, id., and a person's total exclusion
from an academic education because of either a sex-based quota system, see Berkelman
v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 501 F.2d 1264, 1268-70 (9th Cir. 1974), or higher
scholastic admissions standards for members of that individual's sex, see Bray v. Lee,
337 F. Supp. 934, 935 (D. Mass. 1972), noting that Vorchheimer "[had] difficulty in
establishing discrimination." 532 F.2d at 886.
105532 F.2d at 886.
1- 401 U.S. 951 (1971), aff'g mem. 316 F. Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970).
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female state college, "strong, if not controlling authority for" the constitutionality of the single-sex schools of equivalent quality within the
Philadelphia system. 10 7 Judge Weis added, however, that the court
need not decide whether the rational relationship or substantial relationship test should be employed, because, given the facts of Vorch08
heimer, the practice was constitutional under either test.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gibbons characterized the
majority's analysis as "a twentieth century sexual equivalent to the
Plessy decision," employing a separate but equal rationale to support
gender discrimination much as that rationale had supported racial
segregation in the past.' 0 9 The dissent's most serious dispute with the
majority, however, focused on the majority's treatment of the statutory issue."10 Simply stated, Judge Gibbons found the majority's analysis to be "a . . .blatant disregard of the plain meaning of ordinar[y]
statutory words.""' Moreover, he chided the majority for stressing
the legislative history rather than the statutory language of the
EEOA. x l2 In addition to being critical of the majority's use of the legislative history of the EEOA as proposed in 1972 to "supercede the
otherwise clear language of" the EEOA as enacted in 1974,113 the
107

532 F.2d at 887.

108Id. at 888. Without being specific, the majority believed that

[t]he record does contain sufficient evidence to establish that a legitimate educational policy may be served by utilizing single-sex high schools.. .. [G]iven
the objective of a quality education and a controverted, but respected theory
that adolescents may study more effectively in single-sex schools, the policy of
the school board here does bear a substantial relationship.
Id. at 887-88.
109 Id. at 888-89. Judge Gibbons, in fact, began his dissent with a quotation from
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896), with applicable substitutions:
"The object of the [14th] Amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the ...
equality of the two [sexes] before the law, but in the nature of things it could
not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon [sex], or to enforce
social, as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two
[sexes] upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into contact
with each other do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either [sex] to the
other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the
competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power. The
most common instance of this is connected with the establishment of separate
schools for [male] and [female] children, which has been held to be a valid
exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political
rights of [women] have been longest and most earnestly enforced."
532 F.2d at 888 (brackets in original).
110532 F.2d at 889.
-11 Id. at 891.
112

Id.

113 Id. Judge Gibbons indicated that the majority's "use of legislative history" was

"novel." Id.
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dissent contended that the majority "misread" that legislative history
14
to support its finding of ambiguity in the statute. 1
Examining the statutory language, Judge Gibbons concluded that
the Philadelphia school district's practice was violative of the EEOA.
This conclusion was based on two grounds: (1) the school district operated a dual school system, and (2) the assignment of academically
qualified students to single-sex schools resulted in a greater degree of
segregation by sex than if those students had been assigned to the
5
academic high school closest to his or her home."

14 Id.; see id. at 883-84 (majority opinion). The majority, in its finding that the
EEOA of 1974 was "ambiguous," id. at 885, used the fact that sections 201(a) and (e) of
H.R. 13915 (the EEOA of 1972) had at one point, included sex as a prohibited classification, and that it was later deleted without discussion. Id. at 883-84.
However, the EEOA of 1972, when first proposed, did not include sex in any of its
provisions. See H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in Gen. Subcomm.
Hearing, supra note 83, and in H.R. 13915 Hearings, supra note 83. After extensive
hearings, the House Committee on Education and Labor proposed an amended version
of the bill which included sex in sections 2(a), 3(a)(1), and 201(3), although the word sex
had not been included in the corresponding sections of the original bill. Compare H.R.
REP. No. 1335, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 9, 12 (1972) and 118 CONG. REC. 28836 (1972)
with H.R. 13915, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 2(a), 3 (a), 201(c) (1972), reprinted in Gen.
Subcomm. Hearing, supra note 83, at 2, 3, 9 and in H.R. 13915 Hearings, supra note 83,
at 1, 3.
The majority's confusion, in Judge Gibbons' opinion, resulted from reliance upon
Representative Pucinski's analysis of the EEOA, wherein he incorrectly inserted sex into
section 201(a) and (e); his analysis "d[id] not correspond to the . . . language of the Act."
532 F.2d at 892; see id. at 884.
In addition, Judge Gibbons pointed out that if there was any ambiguity in the
EEOA of 1974, the legislative history of this Act (limited to 1974) supported his view
rather than that of the majority, id. at 892; "[t]here was not total silence . . . on the
subject of sex" classifications in the House debate, id. at 893. On the floor of the House,
a co-sponsor of the EEOA had stated that it "would prohibit assignment of students to a
school based on race, color, sex, or national origin." 120 CONG. REC. H2161 (Mar. 26,
1974) (emphasis added). That same day, an amendment to the EEOA which did not
include sex in any of its provisions, was defeated. Id. at H2166. For these reasons, the
dissent concluded that "Congress expressly added sex to the list of prohibited classes
for student assignment and consistently refused to delete it." 532 F.2d at 893.
115 532 F.2d at 890-91.
The dissent found the exclusion of females from Central violative of both section
17 02(a)(1) and section 1703(c). In his opinion, section 1702(a)(1) states the "legislative
finding that the maintenance of a dual school system on the basis of sex violates the
equal protection clause." Id. at 890. Furthermore, section 1703(c) specifically forbids
the assignment of
student[s] to a school, other than the one closest to his or her place of residence
• . . . if the assignment results in a greater degree of segregation . . . on the
basis of race, color, sex, or national origin . . . than . . . if such student were
assigned to [his neighborhood] school.
20 U.S.C. § 17 03 (c) (Supp. V 1975). For a discussion of the majority's and the dissent's
interpretation of the terms "assignment" and "school system," see notes 131-33 infra.
Because Judge Gibbons, unlike the majority, found this legislation applicable to the
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On the direct constitutional question, the dissent concluded that
excluding females from Central does not bear a "fair and substantial
relationship" to the school district's legitimate objectives."16 Since the
stated objectives of the school district are "to encourage academic
facts of this case, he addressed an issue which the majority did not: is the EEOA
"'appropriate legislation' " to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment? 532
F.2d at 893. He noted that "the wording of the E.E.O.A. strongly suggests" that it had
been drafted in light of the interpretation of congressional power set out in Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 532 F.2d at 893; see 118 CONG. REc. 28835-36 (1972)
(remarks of Rep. Pucinski).
In Katzenbach, voters of New York challenged the constitutionality of section 4(e)
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1964), on the grounds that it
exceeded the power granted to Congress under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
384 U.S. at 643-46. This provision of the Voting Rights Act provided that no person who
had completed the sixth grade in a public or accredited school in Puerto Rico could be
denied the right to vote on the basis of an inability to read English. This statute directly
conflicted with a New York statute requiring voters to be able to read and understand
English, as well as a prior decision, Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections,
360 U.S. 45, 50--54 (1959), which had upheld a state law mandating literacy in English
as a condition precedent to voting. 384 U.S. at 643-45, 649. The Katzenbach Court
found the New York literacy requirement unconstitutional since it conflicted with the
federal Voting Rights Act, which the Court termed "appropriate legislation," in that the
federal legislation was within Congress' power to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth amendment. 384 U.S. at 658. Thus, the Court found that by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, the state literacy requirement was unconstitutional to the extent that it
conflicted with the federal legislation. Id. at 646-47. This decision, in Judge Gibbons'
opinion, had the effect of allowing a congressional enactment to contradict a previous
Supreme Court decision. 532 F.2d at 894. But Justice Brennan, in Katzenbach, was
constrained to note that although Congress has the power to enact legislation that will
expand equal protection rights further than had been done by the Court, it may not
contract such rights. 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.
Thus, Judge Gibbons found the rationale of Katzenbach to be applicable to the facts
of Vorchheimer inasmuch as state action was obviously involved, and the relevant provisions of the EEOA expanded rather than contracted equal protection rights. 532 F.2d
at 893-94. This interpretation is ironic in light of the fact that the major portions of the
EEOA were enacted to restrict the use of busing to achieve racial integration of schools.
Compare id. at 893-94 with 20 U.S.C. §§ 1712-1718 (Supp. V 1975). Nothwithstanding
the primary purpose of the Act, Judge Gibbons posited that the legislation "go[es]
further in defining the substantive content of the equal protection clause [regarding
gender-based admissions policies] then had the courts." 532 F.2d at 894. As a result,
Judge Gibbons concluded that the EEOA was constitutional. Id. at 894-95.
For general interpretations of congressional power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, see Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and
Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975); Cox, Forward: ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966).
1'- 532 F.2d at 896. The dissent remarked "that the appropriate standard against
which a disputed gender-based classification should be measured . . . does not spring
from the pages of United States Reports with immediate clarity." Id. at 896 n.15 (citations omitted). He concluded, however, that the rational relationship test was inappropriate in these circumstances and, therefore, employed the substantial relationship test.
See id. at 896.
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achievement" and "to provide educational options,"'1 17 the dissent
agreed with the lower court that the record did not contain sufficient
evidence to prove "that coeducation has an adverse impact upon .. .
academic achievement.""" Indeed, the dissent wryly commented
that the school district could not seriously contend that it had such an
impact, since the remainder of the secondary schools in the system
were, with the exception of three schools, coeducational. 119 Additionally, Judge Gibbons recognized that single-sex schools provided a
choice among educational techniques; however, the policy of sexually
segregating academically oriented schools was not substantially related
to this objective since no coeducational alternative was available on
this level. 120
117Id.; see Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 332 (E.D. Pa. 1975),
rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378
(U.S. Apr. 19, 1977).
11 532 F.2d at 896. The evidence adduced at the district court level had included a
study by Dr. Timball, Professor of Psychology at George Washington University. The
study statistically demonstrated, by an examination of Who's Who of American Women,
"a direct and positive relationship between the number of women who became careersuccessful .. .following graduation . . . and the number of women faculty" teaching at
the institution, and "a direct negative relationship between the number of men students
present at a college and the number of women 'achivers' [sic] graduating from the institution." Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 329-30 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd,
532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S.
Apr. 19, 1977).
The district court had found this study inapplicable for three reasons. First, it contained no information comparing the academic caliber of the single-sex and coeducational schools so "[i]t is extremely doubtful that [these findings] can be applied to
women at an academic high school such as Central." 400 F. Supp. at 333. Second, "fostering career successful women is not one of the [school district's] objectives." Id.
Third, the study showed nothing concerning the effect of a single-sex school on males.
Id.
In addition, Dr. Jones, Professor of Education at Bucknell University, testified concerning the results of a study he had conducted in New Zealand, in which he had found
statistically significant differences between answers concerning attitudes of students attending single-sex schools and those attending coeducational schools. Id. at 330-31. On
the average, students attending single-sex schools "have a higher regard for scholastic
achievement than do the coed students, and that they are more likely . . . to spend more
time at homework than the coed students." Id. at 332.
However, "Dr. Jones [himself] was reluctant to apply the conclusions of the New
Zealand study to American single-sex schools for academically superior students." Id. at
331. For this reason, and because the school district did not show a substantial relationship between these factors and its stated objectives, the district court found this study
inapplicable. Id. at 343.
119532 F.2d at 896. Three comprehensive high schools in the district are also
single-sex schools. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 329 (E.D. Pa. 1975),
rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378
(U.S. Apr. 19, 1977).
120 532 F.2d at 896.
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Although the Vorchheimer court was presented with the opportunity to reexamine the validity of gender-based classifications in the
field of public education in light of significant legislative l2 l and
decisional x22 constitutional developments, the majority nevertheless
found, in accordance with pre-Reed decisions,' 2 3 that substantially
equal, separate-sex academic high schools furthered a legitimate state
interest and were therefore constitutional. 124 Even though the majority's conclusion in Vorchheimer that no federal legislation "authoritatively address[es] the problem"' 2 5 appears correct, the process by
which the majority reached this conclusion is circuitous.
Under traditional canons of statutory construction, a court first
examines the applicable statute to determine whether the language,
on its face, is dispositive of the issue. If it is not, the legislative history
of the enactment is examined to resolve the issue. 126 The Vorchheiner majority, rather than expressly adhering to such principles,
examined the legislative history of both title IX and the EEOA before
making an express determination that the statutory language of the
EEOA was ambiguous.1 2 7 Such a refutation of the EEOA's pertinence
to the Philadelphia school district's policy was unnecessary since a
more traditional analysis of the language of the legislation itself might
have supported the majority's conclusion.1 28
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Gibbons found that sex segregation in Philadelphia's academic high schools was a proscribed practice
under the EEOA. 129 This finding, however, must rest on at least one
of two tenuous assumptions: (1) the single-sex high schools either
constitute a school system, or the entire system can be considered
dual by virtue of these schools; 130 or (2) the students who attend
121
122
123

124
125

See notes 74-89 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 61-73 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 47-59 supra.
532 F.2d at 881.
Id. at 885.

126 2A SUTHERLAND'S STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 46.01-04 (4th

ed. Sands 1973); see, e.g., Globe Seaways, Inc. v. Panama Canal Co., 509 F.2d 969, 971
(5th Cir. 1975) (a court should "not refer to the legislative history if the statutory language is clear .... Congress is presumed to have meant what it said") (citations and
footnote omitted).
127 532 F.2d at 883-84. The majority made "[a]n analysis of the statutory
language,
which recognizes the background to the legislative effort," id. at 885 (emphasis added),
after examining the legislative history, not only of the EEOA but also of title IX-an
admittedly inapplicable statute as well. Id. at 883-84.
128 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 170 2 (a)(1), 1 7 03(c) (Supp. V 1975).
229 532 F.2d at 890-91.
130 See 28 U.S.C. § 17 02(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
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Central and Girls are assigned to their respective schools.'13 Central
and Girls, however, do not themselves constitute a school system
-dual or otherwise; rather, they are a part of the Philadelphia school
system.' 3 2 The fact that they constitute but a small part of this overwhelmingly coeducational school system 3 3 also militates against the
conclusion that the entire school system should be considered dual by
virtue of these two schools. Secondly, academically superior students
are not assigned to the sexually segregated, academic high schools in
the sense that it is mandatory they attend them.' 4 Although she
could have voluntarily attended Girls, Vorchheimer herself chose to
attend a coeducational neighborhood school instead.1 35 Although such
facts make little difference to a student denied admission to a school
solely on the basis of sex, one or both of these factors must be present in order for the school system's practice to fall within the EEOA's
proscriptions. 136
The dispute between the majority and the dissent on the constitutional issue, however, centered on whether the minimum scru13 7
tiny or substantial relationship test should in fact be employed.
Although the majority concluded that the result in this case would be
3

131 See id. § 170 (c).

132 532 F.2d at 881. The dissent, however, terms these two academic high schools
within the school district as "[t]he Philadelphia dual system for scholastically superior
students," and concludes that "Philadelphia operates such a [dual school] system in its
senior academic high schools." Id. at 890-91.
133 See id. at 891.

134 See id. It should first be noted that the EEOA does not define the term "assignment," see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1758 (Supp. V 1975); nor did the majority or dissent explain in what sense they were using the word, see 532 F.2d 881-96. It may be inferred,
however, that the dissent did not view voluntary enrollment and assignment as mutually
exclusive terms. Rather, Judge Gibbons seemed to have employed the term "assignment" to mean enrollment at whichever school a student ultimately decided to attend.
See id. at 889. He noted that "[h]aving met the qualifications for admission to an
academic high school, [Vorchheimer] could be assigned either to Girls on the basis of
her sex, or to a non-academic high school . . . on the basis of her residence." Id. (emphasis added).
The majority, however, used these terms in a different sense. Judge Weis seemed to
believe that because enrollment or attendance at a single-sex academic high school is
voluntary rather than mandatory, such a voluntary enrollment does not constitute an
"assignment." See id. at 882, 885. He remarked that the EEOA was directed against
forced busing of students, and, then concludes that the practice in question was not "an
attempt by a school board to assign 'a student to a school, other than the one closest to
his or her place of residence.' " Id. at 885 (quoting from 20 U.S.C. § 1703(c) (Supp. V
1975)) (emphasis added).
135 532 F.2d at 881.

136 See 20 U.S.C. § 1703(c) (Supp. V 1975).
137 532 F.2d at 896 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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the same under either test, 13 8 it arrived at this conclusion by a misapplication of the substantial relationship test. Since under that test,
the challenged action must be shown to substantially further legitimate ends having a substantial basis in actuality, 139 both the trial
court and the Third Circuit dissent concluded that excluding females
from Central did not bear a substantial relationship to the school
district's stated objectives because the evidence presented by the
school district was insufficient to demonstrate that fact.1 40 In contrast,
the majority summarily concluded that single-sex academic high
schools did bear a substantial relationship to the objective of providing a quality education because the same evidence, deemed insufficient to demonstrate that coeducation had an adverse impact on
academic achievement by the trial court and Judge Gibbons, was sufficient to establish that "adolescents may study more effectively in
single-sex schools."' 14 1 Such speculation concerning the relationship
between the challenged classification and its relationship to legitimate
objectives is appropriate under the minimum scrutiny test; 14 2 but
under the substantial relationship test, this type of correlation must
be demonstrated in fact.
In addition to determining that the exclusion of females from
Central High furthered a legitimate educational policy, the majority
relied upon the facts that a school academically equivalent to Central
was exclusively available to females 14 3 and that no student in the district was compelled to attend either of these single-sex schools.1 4 4 In
relying on these two factors, the majority confused the issue presented in the case. First, by virtue of the trial court's finding that
Central and Girls were substantially equal, 145 the majority began its
equal protection analysis with the premise that females were denied
no benefit granted to males. 14 6 The majority thereby assumed the
138 Id.

at 888.

139 See Gunther, supra note 66, at 21; notes 67-69 supra and accompanying text.
140 532 F.2d at 896; Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 333 (E.D. Pa.
1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W.
4378 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1977). For discussion of the lower court's use of the substantial
relationship test, see note 102 supra. For the lower court's discussion of the evidence
presented, see note 118 supra.
141 532 F.2d at 888 (emphasis added).
142 See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
143532 F.2d at 881.
144Id.
145 Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 329, 333 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd,
532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S.
Apr. 19, 1977).
146 532 F.2d at 886. The majority did not view Vorchheimer's denial of admission to
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validity of "separate but equal" schools for males and females, and
this assumption clouded its examination of the gender-based classification and its relationship to the goals of encouraging academic
achievement and providing educational options. This position, however, only serves to obscure the real question. The central issue in
this case is not whether Vorchheimer and the class of females which
she represents might be able to find "equal" educational opportunity
at Girls High or at any other high school in Philadelphia, but
whether the denial of admission to Central solely on the basis of sex
violated her constitutional right to equal protection.1 4 7 The majority's
analysis begs the question since it starts from the proposition that the
equal educational opportunity required can in fact be given in sexsegregated schools of equivalent quality. In essence, the "separate
but equal" analysis shifts the. emphasis of any inquiry from an examination of the reasonableness of the classification and its relationship to
legitimate objectives, to a determination of the quality of the educational facilities available. If the facilities are found substantially equal,
the plaintiff is hard pressed to show harm; in such a circumstance, an
examination of the classification and its relationship to legitimate interests becomes virtually meaningless.
Central solely on the basis of her sex as a "denial" or a discrimination at all since she
could have gone to Girls High. The majority noted that Vorchheimer "submitted no
factual evidence that attendance at Girls High would constitute psychological or other
injury" and that "the deprivation asserted is . . . the opportunity to attend a specific
school, not . . . an opportunity to obtain an education at a comparable" school. Id. at
882-83.
147 See Comment, supra note 60, at 217.
Additionally, the conclusion that Central and Girls are substantially equivalent is
itself questionable. Central has a science program admittedly superior to that at Girls,
besides having a substantial endowment fund and extremely influential alumni. Vorchheimer v. School Dist., 400 F. Supp. 326, 328-29 (E.D. Pa. 1975), rev'd, 532 F.2d 880
(3d Cir. 1976), aff'd by an equally divided court, 45 U.S.L.W. 4378 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1977).
See also Comment, supra note 24, at 312, where the author makes a convincing
showing that the harms of sex segregation parallel those of race segregation. Women,
like blacks, have a high social visibility and both women and blacks suffer as victims of
the dominant group's reasoning, that they, as a group, possess "inferior intelligence,
scarcity of genuises, freedom in instinctual gratifications, and emotionalism." Id. at
312-13 (citing A. MONTAGUE, MAN'S MOST DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE
181 (4th ed. 1964)). In addition, both females and blacks have been "barred from education, suffrage, certain jobs, and political office [, all] in [their own] best interest." Comment, supra note 24, at 313 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Lastly, the author
points to studies showing that the detrimental psychological and educational effects of
sex segregation are the same as those of race segregation. Id. at 315-16. For a discussion
of these psychological and sociological studies, see id. See also Shaman, College Admissions Policies Based Upon Sex and the Equal Protection Clause, 20 BUFFALO L. REV.
609, 612-13 (1971). Contra, Moody, The Constitution and the One-Sex School, 20 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 465, 469-70 (1971).
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Secondly, it is conceded that the voluntary nature of attendance
at a sexually segregated school will preclude the applicability of the
EEOA.1 48 Although this factor is determinative of the statutory issue,
it should not presumptively rise to the same dimension under the
direct constitutional claim. It bears repeating that the issue is
whether the denial of admission to Central solely on the basis of sex
violated Vorchheimer's right to equal protection. To answer that it
was not mandatory that she attend Girls and that she could attend a
coeducational school of lower quality than either Central or Girls is
49
obviously no answer at all. 1
Admittedly, the issue presented by the Vorchheimer case is not
of the sort which lends itself to a simple resolution. It would seem,
however, that under a substantial relationship test, a gender-based
classification for purposes of admission to a public school should be
deemed impermissible unless the requisite showing has been made
that the classification substantially furthers the legitimate objectives of
the school district. Constitutional issues aside, if one accepts the
proposition that equal educational opportunity should be made available to both sexes, it is submitted that the best method of assuring
this opportunity to all on an equal basis is to refuse to determine
admission to any public school by reference to an individual's sex.
Catherine Moore Curran
See notes 129-35 supra and accompanying text.
But see Moody, supra note 146, at '469-70. The author suggests that the state
may constitutionally provide a choice between coeducational and single-sex schools, as
long as the choice is genuine. Id. at 469 (emphasis added). Her belief is that the conclusion that racially segregated schools are harmful to blacks "is not a constitutional conclusion but a factual one," because "if all-white schools were provided, no white would
attend the non-segregated school." Id. at 470. Thus, no real choice can be made available in the area of race. In contrast, "where co-education is made available as an alternative, it will not fail [; therefore,] there is no constitutional reason for denying a choice to
those who prefer one-sex schools." Id. Under such a theory, it would be constitutionally
permissible for the district to offer alternatives only if the alternatives consisted of
single-sex schools and coeducational schools of the same quality. The choice in the
Philadelphia school district, however, is between a single-sex academic high school and
a coeducational school of lower academic caliber. See 532 F.2d at 881.
148
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